“Multiculturalism” – a dead end in conceptualizing difference, or an open-ended approach to facilitating democratic experiences in the foreign language classroom?

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The focus of this text is on the multicultural condition, related to the foreign language classroom as a possible arena for democratic experiences. However, due to the increasing ambiguity, to say the least, of the conceptions of “culture” and “multiculturalism” today, I will argue that, depending on how “multiculturalism” is conceived, this focus may indeed either lead to a cultural and communicative closure, or open up the possibility of multi-vocal dialogue and communication. If, on the one hand, “multiculturalism” is understood as difference, mainly constituted by a variety of categorized cultural groupings, you may end up essentializing culture to something that people “have”, and that is imposed on them collectively from an outside position. If, on the other hand, cultural differences are seen as constructed within human practices of ongoing narratives and negotiations between individuals and groups – across and beyond all kinds of cultural borders – then the hybrid, pluralistic condition of a society, or even of a foreign language classroom, may offer at least an opportunity for cultural identities to co-construct a social space, where normative conflicts and different viewpoints could be dealt with through multi-vocal deliberative communication.

Introduction

Whereas a discussion about cultural issues may include a number of questions and be carried out along several lines of argumentation, the aim of this text is to investigate how analyses undertaken within some theoretical frameworks of sociology, political philosophy and educational theory, i. e. Zygmunt Bauman (1997, 1999), Seyla Benhabib (2002), John Dewey (1916)
concerning culture, difference and democratic communication may contribute to our understanding of a multicultural foreign language classroom as a potential arena for democratic experiences.

A first important aspect to take into consideration when focusing on multiculturalism in society or in the foreign language classroom, would be to problematize whether discourses on multiculturalism are mainly related to increased immigration and increased ethnic diversity, and “culture” thus understood to be mainly ethnic or national, or if cultural groups could also be conceived of as constituting themselves on the basis of a variety of factors, such as social class, gender, sexual preference, age, religion or even a geographic region within a nation. However, although I will take this broader conception of multiculturalism as a point of departure, I will also argue that a second issue to consider would be the relevance of the term “multiculturalism” as such. The term may indicate that there was once a “normal” state of cultural homogeneity in society from which multiculturalism, no matter how we understand it, may be seen as a kind of deviation (Bauman 1999). The use of the term “multiculturalism”, even in its broader sense, would then suggest just another way of essentializing difference and plurality by reducing the dynamics of sociocultural practice and change to a nicely categorized description of just another status quo. Some further shifts of perspective will therefore be undertaken: from cultural categorization of collective cultural identities to individual cultural self-ascription and narratives (Benhabib 2002), and from the politics of recognition of cultural groups in society to the right of deliberative, democratic participation, especially within the civil sphere of everyday social practices (Benhabib 2002, Dewey 1916, Englund 2004). Finally, as already mentioned, some possible implications of the discussions will be related to the multicultural foreign language classroom as an arena for deliberative, democratic communication.

Cultural difference as a question of ethnicity

Although, as has been argued, a cultural group may constitute itself on the basis of more than ethnicity or nationality, and although an individual usually belongs to several cultural groups and to different groups over a lifetime, discussions and debates on multiculturalism within the Swedish context, both in society as a whole and in education, are frequently related to immigration and to the various problems of integration that are said to arise because people have ethnic backgrounds that differ from the Swedish one, which, in contrast, is not spoken of as ethnic (Sernhede 2000).
Of course there are also other discourses, according to which cultural differences should be recognized and regarded as an asset to the labour market and to society. Nevertheless, even if ethnic discrimination is actively opposed politically, multiculturalism, as I see it, is frequently conceived of as consisting of a variety of more or less well-categorized cultural or ethnic groups coinciding with specific sections of the population. Referring to Benhabib (2002), this may lead on to a reductionist cultural sociology by which culture is seen as something that people “have”, and cultural differences are understood in terms of separate units with homogeneous and more or less well-defined traits. According to Benhabib, much of the debate within political philosophy and the philosophy of justice is dominated by this erroneous epistemology, leading to serious political consequences when it comes to making use of strategies in order to overcome injustice and encourage diversity and pluralism. Consequently, at the same time as various possibilities for a legitimate recognition of cultural differences in society are analysed and debated, for instance among multiculturalist theorists, cultural and ethnic boundaries are not only maintained and taken for granted, but also cherished and controlled.²

As regards the context of foreign language teaching and learning, cultural differences have, until recently, mostly been related to different nation states, where “Swedish” culture has been contrasted to and compared with the “foreign culture” of the target language (Tornberg 2000, 2001). Although this has not usually been regarded as a problem, but rather as an aim for the foreign language curriculum to include – for the development of cultural understanding or even of intercultural competence in the students – the conception of culture as nationally defined and circumscribed is, in my view, based on a similar assumption as the connection between culture and ethnicity, i.e. the assumption that culture is something that you “have” since you belong to a national group. So, if you are for example German you also represent “German culture”.

The view that cultural differences are mainly to be understood as differences between national cultures may be traced back to the Enlightenment and to the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, when national borders were established, collective national identities constructed as part of the powerful nationalist ambitions of different nation states, and Romanticism introduced the idea of culture as a spiritual expression of the nation (Bauman 1999, Benhabib 2002). The specific practices of teaching culture in the foreign language context may, however, also be traced back to a tradition from the Middle Ages, where “antiquities” as part of the content of teaching and learning Latin and Greek dealt with the geography, history, literature and conditions of everyday life during the classical period (Kelly 1969).
Finally, the practices of teaching “language and culture” may be related to the findings of Benjamin Lee Whorf and Edward Sapir (1956) who, on the basis of their anthropological and linguistic inquiries into the languages of North American Indians claimed that different languages also imply different worlds and world views.

Nevertheless, although the selective tradition of conceptualizing culture as nationally defined may still exert a strong influence within the Swedish context (and possibly others) of foreign language pedagogy, alternative discourses, for example in Sweden, also point to the multitude of cultural phenomena and cultural groupings in society today, especially within the English-speaking world, and to a conception of culture as a process of conflict and continuous change (Tornberg 2000, 2001, Lundgren 2002, Gagnestam 2003, St. John 2004).

To summarize my argumentation so far, the conception of cultural differences as a question of ethnicity or nationality builds on some problematic premises:

- a person “has” a culture;
- cultures may be described as well-defined and separated entities;
- cultural borders coincide with specific sections of the population or with nation states;
- cultural borders should be kept in the name of segregation/tolerance/recognition, etc.

How, then, may we proceed to get away from this deadlock of understanding multiculturalism as based on social practices of labelling, categorizing and ordering groups and individuals (Bauman 1995, 1997, 2001, Benhabib 2002)? There may be at least two steps to be taken:

1) a shift of perspective from a categorization of cultures and cultural differences from an outside position to cultural narratives and the right of self-ascription, and a change of emphasis from collective cultural identities to individual identities (Appiah 1994, Bauman 1997, Benhabib 2002).

2) a change of focus from the politics of recognition of cultural groups in society to the right of deliberative, democratic participation especially within the unofficial civil sphere of everyday social practices (Benhabib 2002).
Difference as hybridity based on cultural self-ascription

Whereas each classification of cultural groups from an outside position, for example by political or social elites and institutions or through the media, tends to construct categories for the purpose of controlling ambiguity and keeping the social order intact (Bauman 1995), the shift of perspective to the right of cultural self-ascription leads to more fragmented, narrative descriptions of human action and culture (Benhabib 2002). These narratives may be seen as ongoing, often conflict-laden, contested negotiations about respect, freedom and equality between us and others, across and beyond cultural borders.

Nevertheless, according to Benhabib, we can only learn about who the other is by the stories he or she tells us. We can only learn about the otherness of the other by his or her concrete narratives. And the same goes for our own life histories. Others learn about us, and we learn who we are by constructing our life histories out of the socioculturally woven dialogical fabric that is available to us in our time and place. But this is by no means an unambiguous process. Most individual identities are constructed out of the membership of more than one cultural group, and are based on more than one narrative, which, according to Benhabib, makes our narratives contradictory and our individuality both fragile and unique. It also paves the way for change and hybridity, i.e. a third space of encounter, “the borderline work of culture”, as Homi Bhaba puts it (Bhaba 1994, p. 70), or a discursive space, owned by nobody, and therefore shared by all (Tornberg 2000). In this discursive space identity is constituted by a process of becoming, rather than seen as an end product or a status quo, and individuals viewed as unique with the ability to do the unexpected, and thus to begin something anew (Arendt 1998). By action, understood as communicative action (and narrative), they both enter the pre-set stage of their world as newcomers, and, out of their uniqueness, contribute to its change.

We may add another aspect to the notion of the pre-set stage of the world into which we are born. K. Anthony Appiah (1994, p. 148) calls it the manuscript of a collective identity that individuals can make use of when constructing their own life histories. He points out how important it is to most of us that the meaning we create can somehow be fitted into a wider collective, cultural context, a wider collective meaning. However, to this may also be added the dialogical aspects of being in the world with others, and the power relations in which we are embedded.
Some collective manuscripts, for instance for black and/or homosexual people, have so far been negative, at least in the USA, and must first be made positive, before they can be used for constructing life histories that are worth living with. The Black Power Movement and the Gay Liberation Movement have to some extent contributed to a positive change of the collective manuscripts of black and gay people. Appiah argues however, that this may lead to a new form of oppression. Although the black and the gay may be respected as black and/or gay, and although the collective manuscripts are more positive today than before, there may arise new expectations from these collective manuscripts regarding how a black or a gay person should construct his or her life history. As I understand him, the recognition of a cultural group in society, or a positive collective manuscript is not sufficient. You also have to claim individual autonomy and the right of cultural self-ascription.

Bauman (1997), finally, discusses the right of self-ascription against the background of a moral responsibility towards the Other as being an absolutely unique person. This responsibility is existential, and cannot be negotiated. In the moral space of human interaction, which may be understood both as a part of the social space where we usually live with others, and as something that precedes every rational conception of the Other, his or her absolute uniqueness can only be grasped beyond conscious rationality. As soon as we try to describe this uniqueness, we end up in the usual categorizations and classifications. In society, then, where the social order is built on categorization, rationality and legislation, this order must at least be legitimized by the memory of the responsibility towards the uniqueness of the Other in the moral space. The very idea of justice, Bauman argues, as does Emmanuel Lévinas (1998), is closely connected with this memory of existential responsibility, even when generalized into universally valid ethical rules that can be applied to the plurality of the social world. Consequently, out of this memory of the moral space there must at least exist a possibility for the individual to erase the categorizations and differentiations imposed on him or her by society and to (re)define his or her own identity. Neither state nor institution should have the preferential right of defining who a person is.

The right of deliberative, democratic participation

To Benhabib the right of self-ascription is one of the normative prerequisites of the model for deliberative democracy that she advocates. It means, in short, that no authority should impose cultural membership on a person
with reference to where he or she is born. It also means that a person must be totally free to leave his or her cultural group and to join any group of his or her own choice, i.e. the “freedom of exit and association” (Benhabib 2002, p. 19). She argues that this prerequisite is necessary for the development of cultural pluralism in the liberal democratic state, without endangering the rights of, for example, women and children from minority cultures.

One of her points is that the right of cultural self-ascription must not be regarded as an alternative to universally acknowledged civic and political rights, but should be seen as the public manifestation of the plurality of cultural identities within the public sphere. Another point she makes is that the theory of deliberative democracy regards the civil public sphere, i.e., the more unofficial arena of social movements and of civil cultural and political associations, as the most important arena for the formulation, contestation and discussion of controversial normative questions in which all who are affected can take part. According to the interactive universalism that she supports, all moral beings

... are potential moral conversation partners. It does not privilege observers and philosophers. The boundaries of moral discourses are indeterminate; they include all beings, and not just rational humans, whose interests can be affected by the consequences of one’s actions (Benhabib 2002, p. 14).

In my interpretation, this obviously means that all individuals within the civil public sphere are seen as having the capacity to construct narratives and to co-create new cultural meaning, and at least to strive for a shared understanding through communicative processes. Although legislation and guidelines within the official public arena are important, all conflicts cannot be solved by legislation. However, as Benhabib points out, it is important that the collective social practices in which we participate are seen as the result of our legitimate processes of deliberation.

In laying emphasis on the co-construction of the civil public sphere by a plurality of cultural identities, Benhabib seems to make a move from the cultural to the political. Or, as she articulates this herself in her democratic vision:

The goal would be to move a democratic society toward a model of public life in which narratives of self-identification would be more determinant of one’s status in public life than would designators and indices imposed upon one by others. Call this a postnational, egalitarian democratic vision of modernist cultural vistas (Benhabib 2002, p. 80).
Thus, by the shift of perspectives undertaken so far, we may now have arrived at a somehow extended and more complex conception of culture and cultural differences than could be derived from the ethnic, national approach. This conception, then, implies that

- cultural self-ascription must be a universally acknowledged civic (human) right;
- cultures are hybrid, multi-vocally contested practices of narrative and negotiation between and beyond cultural borders;
- cultural identities are co-constructors of political and social space through processes of deliberation in which everyone who is affected may take part.

The foreign language classroom

The focus of this last section will lie on the questions of how the shift of perspective referred to above may contribute to our understanding of the multicultural foreign language classroom, and in what way the foreign language classroom may also be seen as constituting an arena for democratic experiences.

In my view, the dialogical, multi-vocal and hybrid constructions of the self by cultural self-ascription and narrative, and the deliberative co-constructions of the civil public sphere by the involvement of a plurality of cultural identities, open up another “dual track approach” to an analysis of how the right of self-ascription may influence our conception of the individual student, and what multi-vocal deliberative processes may also be conceived of as possible in the multicultural foreign language classroom.

Following the first “track”, the right of self-ascription problematizes the way we speak and think of the unique individuals we encounter in our daily educational practices. Do we see them as something they have become, or do we see them as involved in a process of becoming (von Wright 2000)? If we speak about them as “immigrant children”, as children with a “Swedish background”, as “good language learners” or “weak language learners”, as “motivated” or “ unmotivated”, as physically or mentally “disabled” or even as simply “the learners”, we have already categorized them and reduced them from our outside, observing position into something that they are or have become. In this perspective, as I would like to argue, “experience” may also be reduced to a thing of the past. Actually, discourses about foreign language teaching and learn-
ing frequently point out how important it is that the content of a lesson can be linked to the experiences of the learners. Although I certainly do not want to object to these recommendations, my point is that if we refer mainly to experiences already made, and which could be described as a “background” or “background knowledge”, we may come to a closure in that we ignore the possibility of new experiences through the hybrid participation in multi-vocal communicative processes in real time.

The notion of the right of self-ascription may help us and our students to see the social practices of, for example, foreign language teaching and learning as a potential discursive space, a kind of borderline work, where people, out of whatever cultural background they may have, tell each other their life histories and emerge as unique individuals. Through their involvement in the multi-vocality of dialogical, pluralistic and contingent narratives, they will probably also make completely new experiences that may change the way they know the world and their attitudes towards the otherness of the other as well as towards themselves.

However, there are certain aspects of power to be taken into consideration when discussing the possibilities of dialogical and contingent communication in the foreign language classroom. Such power aspects prevail both within the institutional framework of education itself, where the unequal relations between teachers and students are almost built into the system, but also where the relations between the students may be biased by competition, domination, subordination and conflict due to cultural, social, gender, and other factors. These kinds of bias will probably obstruct most of our efforts to facilitate opportunities of multi-vocal communication, unless we add, what John Dewey (1916/1944) calls a dimension of shared interests. The following quotation may clarify the matter:

The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity (Dewey 1916/1944, p. 87).

In my view, this quotation expresses, albeit in a different wording, what Benhabib has described as the co-construction of the civil public sphere by the participation of a plurality of cultural identities. In an interesting analysis of Deweys’ later works on democracy Axel Honneth (2003) argues that to the later Dewey a democratic morality or attitude among the citizens of a society, as well as their willingness to engage politically in democratic
practices, was a result of positive experiences from democratic problem solving made earlier in life. Thus, at least according to Dewey, the normative idea of democracy is above all based on a social ideal. This may have direct implications for education as a whole and for the foreign language classroom as a potential arena for democratic experiences. I will therefore proceed to the “track” of deliberative communication, aiming at the multi-vocal co-construction of a civil public sphere, which in our case may be the multicultural foreign language classroom.

In a similar way as Dewey, Tomas Englund (2004) points to the importance of the formation of a deliberative, democratic attitude through education. He claims that education may play a key role in the development of the political autonomy of the individual. Deliberative communication, he argues, may be conceived of as complementary to other teaching and learning practices, since deliberation focuses not on facts, but on values, opinions and perspectives regarding a variety of controversial questions that may also be discussed within the official public sphere of society. According to Englund (2004, p. 62) deliberative communication has the following characteristics as summarized below:

- it allows for different, opposing points of view to be expressed;
- it implies tolerance and respect towards the concrete other, which also means that one learns how to listen to the arguments of the other;
- it strives for a shared understanding and for consensus, although this consensus may only be temporary, since a real consensus has not been reached;
- it allows for traditional views and authorities to be questioned;
- it promotes deliberation for the purpose of problem solving without the presence of a teacher.

It goes without saying that the responsibility of the teacher will be crucial to the realization of deliberative communication for example in the foreign language classroom. This responsibility presupposes, as Englund points out, a good deal of intuition and sound judgement regarding how a shared interest may be developed that at the same time allows for different, opposing points of view to be expressed. It also requires the courage and open-mindedness of the teacher to expose him/herself to criticism and questioning by deliberating students.

How, then, more precisely, may we conceive of deliberative communication, aiming at the multi-vocal democratic co-construction of the civic public...
sphere of the foreign language classroom? Is it important, or can we do without it? And what about language? Must we not first concentrate on the development of communicative skills? Must the students not first learn the language before they can use it for “real” communicative purposes?

My questions are only partly rhetorical, since there may be many objections raised to my suggestion, namely that we may understand the content of foreign language teaching and learning as focusing on the hybridity of multi-vocal narratives, and on the co-construction of a shared interest in the civil public sphere of the classroom. I will argue that both language itself, lacking meaning until we use it for specific purposes in specific contexts and the communicative, cultural approach to language pedagogy in many parts of the world today indeed offer a great potential for a change of perspectives as to what should be dealt with in our practices of teaching and learning languages (Tornberg 2000).

Of course, we cannot do without teaching the language, and the students must develop their linguistic proficiency in order to be able to use the language as a flexible tool for communication across linguistic borders for personal as well as for professional or academic purposes. However, this is not my point. As I have argued elsewhere (Tornberg 2000, 2003, 2004) the “curse” of language pedagogy may be the extremely persistent argument that a language first has to be learnt before you can use it. This may in turn lead to an overemphasis on communicative exercises, whereas “real” communication will be postponed to “real” situations somewhere in the future. In my opinion, the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (Council of Europe, 2001), which has had a great influence at least on Swedish curricular texts in recent years, also lays strong stress on competencies and skills to be developed for future needs. My point is a different one and here I would like to refer to Hans Eberhard Piepho (1996), who distinguishes between communication as an aim of language education and as a principle of education. When communication is conceived of as a principle of education, he argues, the focus will lie on the intersubjective and dialogical aspects of language developed within encounters of individuals in the teaching and learning situation. In this way “communication” is understood as an issue of real-time-experiences.

Another objection that may be raised against the suggestions above is that the language learner may be lacking in the linguistic and communicative skills needed to partake in multi-vocal, dialogical narration and communication, let alone in deliberation about controversial, value-laden questions. This may be the case, although it also depends on how we, as teachers, value the language in process that our students are using. Claire Kramsch (1996) expresses this in the following way:
... language learners can start using the foreign language not merely as imperfect native speakers, but as speakers in their own right. It is in this development of the foreign language learner as both a social and an individual speaker that we have to see the emergence of culture in the language classroom (Kramsch 1996, p. 28).

In my interpretation, this quotation somehow offers a summary of my discussion so far. In regarding language learners as speakers in their own right, and both as social and individual speakers, the culture of the language classroom that they develop may also be seen in terms of the space of shared interest that Dewey and Englund discuss, and as the multi-vocal co-construction of the civil public sphere by the involvement of a plurality of cultural identities, i.e., Benhabib’s perspective.

**Conclusion**

The aim of my discussion has been to investigate how analyses undertaken within a few theoretical frameworks of sociology, political philosophy and educational theory may contribute to our understanding of the multicultural condition of the foreign language classroom as a potential arena for democratic experiences. So, what have we found?

My first point concerns the relevance of the term “multiculturalism”. In what way does this term contribute to our understanding of cultural self-ascription and narratives, and of hybrid multi-vocality in our classrooms? Is multiculturalism a term that has come to the fore during the last few decades because the plurality of society (which, in fact, has always existed) has changed character? If this change means that there is more ethnic diversity in society today than before, the term may be reserved for those contexts where ethnic diversity is made an issue and where a multicultural foreign language classroom may be understood as an ethnically diverse classroom. (As to the multilingual classroom, which is a quite different matter, see Hans-Jürgen Krumm, this volume). If on the other hand, we regard plurality as something more complex than ethnic or cultural diversity, the term may be of little relevance to us unless we connect it to a conception of difference by which the multicultural condition may be seen as an aspect of the human condition.

The human condition according to Hannah Arendt (1998), implies among other things that we are all born into the pre-set stage of the world as newcomers. Nevertheless, although the stage is set and we are newcomers to it, we are all unique, which means that we cannot be du-
plicated. Out of our uniqueness we may do unexpected things, take the initiative and, by beginning something anew, contribute to change. Since action to Arendt is communicative action, my interpretation is that such action may mean self-ascription, narratives and deliberation.

My second point concerns language and how we usually understand the practices of foreign language teaching and learning. Who decides its content? And why? Since language itself lacks meaning until we use it for specific purposes in specific contexts, there is a great potential in language teaching and learning to use it for the construction of that discursive space, that third space of articulation, where speakers in their own right may develop a dimension of shared interest. On the basis of this shared interest, then, self-ascription, narratives and deliberative communication may be facilitated even if the linguistic means available are limited. In this way, the foreign language classroom could be seen as an arena where we are all in the process of becoming, a process that will be multi-vocal and contingent and that may in fact be a democratic experience as well.

Notes

1. The problems may manifest themselves, for instance, in discrimination on the labour market. According to a series of articles in the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* in September 2004, job applicants with all the necessary qualifications but a “foreign”, maybe Middle Eastern-sounding name often run into difficulties having their applications considered, let alone being asked to interviews. Ethnicity as a problem is sometimes also discernible in educational discourse, where multicultural schools are most often understood as schools with a large proportion of immigrant children or students (Bunar 1999). In addition, these multicultural schools are frequently described as deviating from the Swedish educational majority norm and considered a problem because of the children with a different culture (Tesfahuney 1999). A major difficulty with these children and students is often described in terms of their lack of skills in the Swedish language, which prevents them from successfully finishing their education. The “culture of the other” and language as a problem are then given as explanations for conflict and lacking integration (Osman 1999). In other words; the children are the problem, not the segregating and labelling practices of school and society.

2. Here Benhabib refers especially to some communitarians such as Charles Taylor (1994) and Will Kymlicka (1995).

3. Bauman’s conception of a moral space builds squarely on the work of Emmanuel Lévinas and his strong emphasis on the Other as the Face to whom we have a fundamental moral responsibility. This responsibility constitutes both the beginning of our relation to the Face, a relation against all logic and a kinship outside of all biology (1999, p. 87) and the principle of our own individuation. “Responsibility is an individuation, a principle of individuation. On the famous problem: ‘Is man individuated by matter, or individuated by form,’ I support individuation by responsibility for the other” (Lévinas 1998, p. 108).
4. Benhabib argues that cultural essentialism often works in two ways. Due to specific defensive cultural strategies individuals within a cultural group may be locked up in seemingly unambiguous cultural interpretations and psychological motives whereby any intention of the individual is reduced to cultural stereotypes. These inhibitory strategies are most frequently applied to women and children.

5. The model of deliberative democracy, according to Benhabib, implies a dual track approach to politics. This means that the model accepts both legal regulation and intervention in, for example, multicultural conflicts and controversies, and a normative, deliberative dialogue within the civil public sphere. One of the main objections to this model, as Benhabib points out, has been that it presupposes consensus i.e. that contacts and deliberation between different groups within the civil sphere will lead to results acceptable to all. However, as Benhabib argues, although consensus cannot be presupposed, the mere occurrence of civil multicultural dialogue will in the long run lead to a civic perspective and a broadened way of thinking.


7. According to Englund (2004), the idea of deliberative communication emanates from at least two traditions of thought, one within education and one within political science. Both traditions are in a process of expansion: within political science as deliberative democracy and communicative rationality, for example by Jürgen Habermas (1996) and in education by the sociocultural perspective of learning.

References


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