Does paradox count in education?

Lars Løvlie

I am here taking a look at the so-called pedagogical paradox, which typically involves a contradiction between what I say and what I do. My impression is that most philosophers do not care much about the pedagogical paradox; they very often write as if it does not exist, especially when they relate explicitly to education. One reason for this seems to be that they are forgetful of childhood and its basic place in educational thinking. Immanuel Kant, in contrast, made the pedagogical paradox into a key element in education, particularly in the introduction to his lecture notes on pedagogy, published in 1803 by his friend Friedrich Theodor Rink, with the title Über Pädagogik or On Education. The autonomy and dignity of the child in its transcendent, invisible and silent dimension carries the whole argument in On Education. Kant deals with the pedagogical paradox by consistently furnishing every advice on Erziehung or upbringing with a tag that says caution: discipline the child but don’t make his mind slavish; impose rules on him but remember to allow for his free judgment; praise him but don’t foster his vanity, constrain him but let him savour his freedom and dignity. If Kant is the philosopher teacher, William Wordsworth is the poet teacher. Wordsworth’s phrase “The Child is father of the Man” suggest that we can appreciate the pedagogical paradox only if we have access to childhood in its aesthetic dimensions. The question of education seems to bring the German Pietist and the English Romanticist face to face.

Keywords: paradox, autonomy, childhood.

I would like to broach the so-called pedagogical paradox, an issue discussed in the German and Nordic tradition (Von Oettingen 2006), but often seen as having slight implications for educational practice. The paradox contains two premises at loggerheads, as when a teacher invites the students to a free dialogue but insists on setting the rules for the dialogue herself. Or in more general terms, if we go Kantian and

Lars Løvlie is Professor of Philosophy of Education, Oslo University, Institute for Educational Research, P.O Box 1092, Blindern, N-0317 Oslo. E-mail: lars.lovlie@ped.uio.no
celebrate the fact that young people are capable of autonomous moral judgment, but take it for granted that the teacher is the one who determines how they should practice that autonomy. Is this paradox relevant for education, and is it worth taken seriously at all by educationists? I think so, and I have on different occasions insisted that this paradox should be considered by practicing teachers, not least by teachers of philosophy with children. I think, too, that the paradox should have its place in a fully-fledged idea of an education for citizenship. But alas! This view is often met with some surprise and a certain annoyance among fellow educationists. In some cases, especially among teachers, I have felt a mixture of impatience and irritation in the audience when the question has been raised. Why, they seem to think, put this irrelevant topic on top of the strains and stresses of a workplace that demands full attention to teaching and administration? They are right. Today's practicing teachers have an impressive job to do, and paradoxes seem to be of scant help in their daily work, for they do not solve any of their pressing problems. Even so I dare make one more go at my question, in the hope that the reader will see some merit in taking another look at the problem in some of its aspects.

Why this apparent indifference or even animosity among teachers and educationists in general? Let me suggest one answer by making a short detour. For there is another name to, or should I rather say, version of the paradox that is primarily political. It is evident in the paternalism – or, if you will: maternalism – of politicians and civil servants, advisers and social workers. Individuals, who regard themselves as responsible adults in a democratic society, resist being told by others how to vote in the elections, make their moral decision, or adopt a certain life style for health reasons. As independent persons they have no track with paternalism. They want to decide according to their own best judgment, even if that means going against the advice of experts on issues; and they expect the same of their fellow citizens. But there is an exception. Children and young persons till the age of 18 are not regarded as adults in our society. Good judgement in social and political matters is not attributed to them, and they are not regarded as fully responsible persons in society. The view is mirrored in the fact that legally they are not citizens with their full rights and duties. So it seems that in the case of persons even well into their teens we should not suspend or reject paternalism, but rather support it. It belongs simply to our responsibility as parents and teachers and school owners to embrace paternalism in matters pedagogical. From the paternalist point of view the pedagogical paradox simply does not exist.

That this view is inadequate also in its legal aspects is supported by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, of 1989. It is also, as I
will try and show, inadequate in its pedagogical aspects. Let me leave paternalism here and restate the paradox in its pedagogical context. I offer no pat resolution to the paradox, but rather present it as an open-ended invitation to educational imagination and reinterpretation. For paradoxes do not give marching orders, they are not instrumental or for utility. Paradox has been used as a method in psychiatry, that is true, but paradox is for self-reflection rather than for therapeutic action. As we know, just as silence may speak out loud, inaction can also impact on the world. For better or worse, paradoxes make us stop in our stride, tell us to hesitate, and force us to review our plans and prejudices. The paradox is a nuisance for those with a definite goal in mind, and a reminder for those who want to learn from it. It strikes a note of caution to sensitive teachers that the business of teaching does not always proceed according to order and rules and habits. It even suggests that teaching may be closest to failure at exactly the point where it seems the most successful.

Let me end this section with a further description of the pedagogical paradox. It is worth noting that there is no purely logical contradiction involved here, in the sense of a clash between two terms that cancel each other out, as when I state that something is both A and non-A. It is not a case of bad thinking or poor logic, but belongs to and is born in the interaction with the world. The clash is between what you say and what you do, as when you ask a child to freely draw her favourite fish and then censure her for giving it a pair of legs, or ask a student to give free reign to her thoughts on an oral exam, knowing well that you and your colleague are there to give her a grade. This is a practical fallacy, a pragmatic paradox rather than a logical. A psychological – and very clever – version of the pragmatic paradox was, as many may remember, described in Gregory Bateson’s double bind theory of the 1950’s (Bateson 1956). There the contradiction between what a person says and what you can tell from her body posture and facial expressions becomes part of a deeply pathological interaction that tends to drive the victim crazy. The pedagogical paradox typically arises when a teacher says that education should foster autonomy – autonomy in the sense of a free essence, expression or decision of self, the *Selbstbestimmung* of a subject that acts according to his own lights – , and then proceeds to claim her authority and the strictures of prescribed rules. From the student’s point of view the question is how I can let the teacher decide what it is to be autonomous and still be true to my independent thinking. The paradox precipitates a clash between *Selbstbestimmung* and *Fremdbestimmung*, between a person’s own reasoning and that imposed by the other, and makes for a distortion of interaction that is often not fully understood by the parties.
Informed forgetfulness

My impression is that most philosophers do not care much about the pedagogical paradox; they very often talk and write as if it does not exist, especially when they relate explicitly to education. G.W.F. Hegel, for instance, did not extend his dialectical perspective to education. His vision of education seems to have been confined to the type of school in which he taught. In his yearly talks, or Berichte, as Rector for eight years at the neo-humanist Gymnasium in Nuremberg, he did not question the uses of authority or the prescribed curriculum, and comes forth as a straightforwardly dull teacher (Schmidt 1960). His relevance for education, which is considerable, lies elsewhere in his philosophical work. William James did much the same thing. A highly imaginative and creative philosopher and phenomenologist, his Talks to Teachers turns to behaviourist thinking for pedagogical advice. This advice is not only forgetful of childhood but goes against his seminal idea of “the stream of consciousness” and its relevance for a childhood perspective. Why is this? Again, my immediate answer is that both philosophers thought of childhood in terms of what traditionally belongs to three institutions: church, family and school, and that childhood was a time for discipline and learning and preparation for the future. In contradistinction to his contemporary John Dewey, who took childhood to be the matrix of education, James’s advice implies that children are immature and not fully formed individuals, so that their education has to be executed and controlled by the teacher.

This traditional view is, of course, in certain respects wholly sound and legitimate. If it means to sit at the table and eat with a spoon, to dress oneself, and acquire polite manners, discipline is necessary. If children are to participate in and contribute to society, they must – in Immanuel Kant’s words – be both civilised, cultured, and “moralised”, that is, be brought up to moral thinking. But can the prime aim of an enlightened education according to Kant, that of personal autonomy, be an object of teaching? The founder of the London school of philosophy of education in the 1960s, Richard S. Peters, seems to think so. He writes as a liberal philosopher, but then gives it away by presenting a striking metaphor at the end of his article “Education as Initiation” (Peters 1972 p. 107), describing children as barbarians waiting outside the walls of civilization, for us grown-ups to let in. If metaphors mean what they say, and they do, this one places childhood outside of the adult world, in a pedagogical province of the speechless. A barbarian is literally one who stutters, who is not fully versed in speaking his or her mind. Such people lack the trappings of reason and independent judgment. Richard Rorty takes a similar but more outspoken stance in the
article “Education as Socialization and as Individualization”. There he proposes that education up to the age of 18 should be mostly a matter of socialisation, of inculcating the values of tradition – “… of getting the students to take over the moral and political common sense of society as it is”. Then, after the students have left high school for colleges and universities there is time for their “revolt” against inculcation and their quest for individual self-creation. There is something missing in the two accounts. Rorty’s scheme cannot explain how self-creation or personal autonomy can come about abruptly at age 18. Peters’ metaphor does not explain how children can realise their personal autonomy in society – initiation alone does not do the job.

The problem of Peters’ metaphor and Rorty’s proposal runs deeper. In their articles they not only seem to take for granted that childhood is per definition and on the whole an age of deficit and insufficiency in intellectual and moral independence. They also think of education as strongly institutionalised activities, taking place in schools, colleges and universities. They also seem to assume that childhood is wholly other, that there is a gap between man’s “first” and “second” nature as a cultured person – this is Hegel’s chosen metaphor –, and that childhood must be left behind and replaced by the fully functioning and responsible adult. They seem to accept Rousseau’s view that childhood is a world of its own, but in their philosophical thinking they make the wrong cut, and detach, separate and isolate that existence from adult life. They do not find the life of the child in its inner workings of much interest, or how, in the words of the English poet William Wordsworth, the child can be the father of the man. Thus they are unable to explain how young people grow into autonomous, that is, self-legislating adults in the moral and social sense. It seems that the discovery – or if you will: invention – of childhood continues, under the irresistible pressure of educational tradition, to stay sectioned off from adulthood in post-industrial society, forgetful of the child and bent on utility. The vital association that Rousseau and his followers found between the child’s life and adult life in the idea of human nature – the lasting legacy of Romanticism – has withered under a paternalism that is repeated in the performance psychology of today’s educational management policies.

Rousseau’s self-deception

But then Rousseau was the man who, contrary to expectation and to the dismay of his critics, openly rejected the pedagogical paradox and thus denied its relevance to education. To repeat from history: in book 5 of Émile the philosopher who invented childhood and kick-started
the Romantic Movement, also furnished us with the most blatant version of the pedagogical paradox. In that book, as we recall, the time has come for young Émile to choose a wife, and he is, according to the narrative, set to make the choice according to his own feelings and wishes. Then, without any further ado, the author steps out of the text and declares that he, the tutor, is going to pick Émile’s wife, Sophie, for him. In other words, the relationship with Sophie is going to be Émile’s own choice, but his tutor is making it for him. Rousseau’s contemporaries put the paradox to him, but to my knowledge he never admitted it – it seems he did not perceive a real dilemma here.

Why not? I offer two possible interpretations. At the very end of Book 5 the tutor declares his deeply felt wish to end up as the friend of his young charge. In a friendship between persons who mutually consider each other to be independent and authentic selves, the pedagogical paradox melts into air. Since the paradox in its paternalist version is based on a lopsided distribution of authority, it is laid to rest between persons who meet on an equal footing in a personal friendship. Émile’s tutor seems to have taken the child’s authenticity as a fact from the beginning, such that his final declaration of friendship with his former charge was only the perfect educational relationship coming to its natural fruition. Since there was no paternalism at the end station, there could not really be paternalism on the journey towards it. A different interpretation is that the author Rousseau combined his ideal of the noble savage with his belief in the authority of contemporary natural philosophy – the French naturalist and writer George Buffon comes to mind. In that case he could talk with full assurance on behalf of a scientific thinking that later came to be known as psychology. Rousseau did not speak in the hypothetical attitude, then, but on the authority of child psychology. In any case, it seems that by not admitting to the educational paradox he also threw the gates open to the more or less visible paternalism within later child centred pedagogy: I know my child psychology and I feel your innermost self; I empathise with your most secret inclinations and hopes; I know you better than yourself. Since I am wholly dedicated to your welfare and freedom, I cannot possibly wish to dominate you even if I control your life. In the best of paternalist worlds there seems to be no discrepancy between the child’s wishes and those of his teacher, no discord in feelings and no difference in aims between the two. This symbiosis, I suggest, is the self-deception that is left implicit and untouched in Rousseau’s Bildungsroman.
Kant’s redress

I have singled out some philosophers for their negligence of the pedagogical paradox and for not saving childhood from their paternalist embrace. But my main task is further to explore the pedagogical paradox, and that brings me to Kant. It is easy to miss the fact that Kant was almost bound to acknowledge the pedagogical paradox in his educational thinking because of the intimate link he forges between morality, the idea of an autonomous person, and education. He made, as we remember from introductions to his work, the vital distinction between legality and morality, that is, between following a rule because it benefits me, and following a rule because it satisfies the moral point of view, which is to act from reason and not from self interest. To extend on the two significant terms in this essay: reasoning from utility, legal or otherwise, implies *Fremdbestimmung*, whilst moral reasoning implies *Selbstbestimmung*. The idea of personal autonomy depends on this distinction and from the corollary that we are free, in the sense of self-determining persons, only when we act according to our own moral reason – this is the mark of our abiding humanity. Kant made the pedagogical paradox into the key element in education in the introduction to his lecture notes, published in 1803 by his friend Friedrich Theodor Rink, with the title *On Education*:

One of the greatest problems in education is how subjection to lawful constraint can be combined with the ability to make use of one’s freedom. For constraint is necessary. How shall I cultivate freedom under conditions of compulsion? I ought to accustom my pupil to tolerate constraint upon his freedom, and at the same time lead him to make good use of his freedom.⁸

At first glance it seems in this quote that freedom is restricted, defined or circumscribed by constraint – that there is freedom only “under conditions of compulsion”. But a closer look reveals an antinomy between freedom and constraint, a basic opposition in which the first term cannot yield to the second. If it does there is no free will in the sense of independent choice, and the fond talk of freedom becomes only a show for the credulous. Freedom cannot, if only per definition, be the object of constraint. What is it then? Kant regards freedom without constraint as the capability of children, in his case people under the age of sixteen, to make independent use of their reason. By the independent use of his wits the child may, of course, submit to constraint if he feels that it chimes with his moral capability. This capability is in part acquired and thus a product of education. But the spark within this capability is the fact of human freedom that cannot
and should not be reduced to the character traits, abilities or habits of the young person.

The paradox of education is that autonomy — the freedom of self-determination — both belongs to the child and is ascribed to him; and has to be brought into being by the intervention of others. Kant repeatedly presents us to this paradox. In one place he says: “Man can become man through education only. He is only what education makes him.” (Kant 1962, p 699). In another he emphasises that “Maxims must issue from man himself”, and adds that moral judgment “must issue from man’s own reason” (Kant 1964, p 740). How does he solve the paradox? Let us make some steps towards the reasoning he inspires. Only a human being can be autonomous in the sense of himself stating the moral rules that he abides by (there are only boys in Kant’s classes). Dogs, cats and parrots are not autonomous, even when they roam freely about. They are only natural beings conditioned by the laws of nature. Only moral beings are able to judge and act according to principle, independently of inclination, social influence or political authority. In the lecture notes we may get the impression that autonomy or independent judgment is a capability or even skill that has to be developed. But autonomy goes deeper. Autonomy—literally “self-legislation”—is simply the defining characteristic of a human being, be it a child or an adult. It may seem preposterous to say that a child is autonomous when we all know that children are dependent persons in need of care and supervision. But the whole argument and the educational advice in On Education rest on that proposition as acceptable, reasonable or true. If we deem freedom to be a foolish vanity, and stop talking about autonomy as something properly belonging to me as a member of humanity, there is precious little to carve out of Kant’s treatise. If we give up autonomy, we are left with its opposite, heteronomy, that is, persons as pure products of discipline and training. That, however, makes us unable to explain why children do not become replicas or copies of tradition, but grow to up to be independent and critical judges of society.

Let us pursue the idea that we are, in Kant’s own words, “born” autonomous; that it belongs to us as our birthright as human beings to be autonomous. Kant elsewhere even alludes to autonomy as being “outside of history”, in other words something that does not change or grow in history, but is still an inherent or infinite part of humanity. Now what is outside of history and yet belongs essentially to the history of humanity cannot be an item or thing brought into our moral household from without. It cannot be an acquired or imposed knowledge, for that would imply that we are complete products of our upbringing, which would make training, instruction and teaching the
only tasks of pedagogy. Moral education is possible because we are, as humans, already constituted as moral beings; and that this innate, infinite readiness to distinguish between right and wrong, this initial respect for justice and dignity, contributes to making moral education possible in the first place.

Kant has rightly been criticised for making up two worlds, one for the subjective mind and another for objective nature. But in *On Education* it is precisely his highlighting of the subject that makes it a treatise on the pedagogy of freedom. His is a child that always already belongs to *Menschheit* or humanity, a human being with a budding reason and self-respect. Kant’s respect for the human being in its own freedom is all over his moral philosophy, and it is this philosophy that prevents us from taking his notes only as a report on the individual intellectual functions of the child and the uses of reason that should be fostered in school. Whether you call it freedom or autonomy, all-important is his attribution of dignity to mankind as manifest in childhood. Kant is the philosopher after Rousseau who has not forgotten childhood, neither in his own life nor in that of the coming generation. His lecture notes reminds us about, shows us and consistently state the educational point of view, that the knowledge of childhood and the perspective of the child is pivotal in any pedagogy worth its salt. It is the notion of autonomy in its transcendent, invisible and silent dimension that carries the whole argument of *On Education*. It is the notion that fills out and makes the actual uses of independent reason in the relationship between master and student to an educational goal. The gist of Kant’s philosophy of education can be capped in one sentence: always in your teaching remember to care for the child’s freedom and dignity.

Educationists will easily find fault with Kant’s idea of autonomy, because it is so utterly abstract. The idea implies that moral and political education cannot be the direct object of teaching or training, or the regular part of educational planning and execution. Since autonomy is invisible, that is, neither a virtue nor a skill or a habit, it is the ghost in the schoolroom, a flimsy figure always receding from our grasp, and for all practical purposes impossible to make use of. Yet we cannot, I think, just throw off the presence of this idea both as a fact of our moral life, and as part of our educational enterprise. If you think of it, similar ideas are already part and parcel of education. Imagining the future adult in a child is surely abstract, but parents carry that imagination with them the same way Kant asks us to do. The basic aims of a national curriculum as expressed in the first paragraph of Norway’s National Education Act, are indeed abstract ideals that defy realisation. For one thing, they cannot be made into finite goals
of teaching without losing their force – a goal attained is no longer an aim to be reached. For another, the point of the ideal of an education for democracy is, of course, that it should never be realised. History teaches us time and again that realisation of social utopias, democratic or otherwise, ends in fundamentalism and totalitarianism. Just as invisible freedom may hold the teacher back from trespassing on the child's dignity, invisible democracy may temper and control our malpractice of democracy. Kant’s liberal philosophy of education makes us see the stamp of humanity in each individual person. Here is the place where Kant’s philosophy of education joins forces with the cosmopolitanism of his 1795 treatise on *Perpetual Peace*. Here, too, is the place where we find the antidote to consumer individualism, contemporary neo-moralism and the cult of identity.

**Childhood recollected**

Kant was deeply influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his view of education. This is often overlooked by those who read him as a dull, rule-ridden moralist, bent on making the child the slave of duties. Therefore an association with William Wordsworth and his motto “The Child is father of the Man” is not taken totally out of the blue, but forges the link between Kant and his great inspiration, Rousseau’s *Émile – or on education* (1762). Of course, their configuration of childhood is different: Kant with his bearings in the *logos* of philosophical thinking, Wordsworth exploring the *pathos* of nature and human affections. The former was bound by his vocation as philosopher, the latter, in his *Preface* to Lyrical Ballads, made poetry his calling. I do not here intend to mix philosophy and poetry, thinking and feeling, Kant and Wordsworth by a forced marriage. But some points of convergence, in the manner of a sketch only, are worth mentioning. Wordsworth does not regard his work as dabbling in feelings, but as a poet’s realistic and reasonable approach to making relevant experiences. He opens the *Preface* by writing that his Ballads were “… published as an experiment, which, I hoped, might be of some use to ascertain, how far, by fitting to metrical arrangement a selection of the real language of men in a state of vivid sensation, that sort of pleasure and that quantity of pleasure may be imparted, which a Poet may rationally endeavour to impart.”

Wordsworth is the poet teacher. His is a different reason from Kant’s, but reason it is. Poetry is just another way of coming to terms with complex life.

Wordsworth, we note, in his motto writes child with a capital C and man with a capital M. Giving the two nouns capital letters im-
plies that he has childhood rather than the individual child in mind; and that man does not primarily denote male manhood but rather humankind or humanity in general. He is not out to tell us what we all take for granted, that childhood comes before adulthood in time, or that childhood experience determines adult life in some way or other. His message is rather that adults get closer to their human nature or realise their humanity only if they repeat, recollect and reinterpret their childhood world in their present life. The presence of childhood gives adult experiences their timbre, affections their colour, and emotions their force. Recollection is neither a copying of the past nor the past resurrected. It is rather a creative *mimesis* giving birth to renewed perceptions and events in one’s life, the infinite revealed in finitude. It is, in the end, the awareness of how Child passes into Man and Man passes into Child – both passing into each other, each different from the other and yet part of each other, a play or dialectic of shifting configurations. The well-known Rubin’s vase may illustrate my point. The shift from seeing the vase and the two faces is a passing from the one aspect to the other in the very same thing, each being the condition of the other, each bringing the other into presence in instant and almost imperceptible shifts – a restless back and forth. There is, in this still life, no reducing the one to the other, nothing that is transmitted from here to there, just this juxtaposition and co-presence of Child and Man – pure transparency you might say, pure seeing. Put time and chronology aside for a moment, and ponder how your childhood background coexists with its adult surface, as the child shines through in the face of an old person on a photograph – life at a standstill. Then try to appreciate how Wordsworth’s figure of speech is basic for the educational point of view – childhood as the crucial motif and motive for the art of education.

When we extend Kant’s formal insistence on the dignity of the child to education, and link and intertwine childhood and adulthood as suggested by Wordsworth, we are better able to appreciate how childhood is the author and authority of educational thinking. From the transparent relation – manhood mirroring childhood – comes a different perspective on the pedagogical paradox. A paradox is, as we saw above, characterised by two terms fighting each other, rejecting each other, keeping each other at distance, in an external and hostile relation. What is suggested – or rather added in my description – is the other and equally important side of the relation: the literal composition or concurrence between the terms in their internal interplay. A paradox in this sense exists or lives, as some couples prefer, together apart. There is a subtle shift here from opposition to composition. This seems to take the bite out of the paradox with opposition as its
driving force. Isn’t the paradox then eliminated, purged, done away with? It seems not. For there is no fusion of terms or final reconciliation between parties, no closure that would eliminate the paradox. But there is the ever open question of how to solve the paradox in actual situations.

The paradox is an invitation to tact and discretion in education, to that in-between reflection that acknowledges the problem but hesitates as to its answers – which is freedom in action. Tact and discretion are dependent on sense, again a word of sameness and difference. You can read from the dictionaries in the main European languages that the word sense denotes two different realms or worlds, that of sensibility and of meaning, of sensing something and getting the sense of it. The first is related to the senses of seeing, hearing, and touching, the other to the interpretation and comprehension, to our intellectual grasp of the world. The one reaches outwards, as when I utter: “I sense autumn in the air”. The other reaches inwards, as when I answer: “That makes sense to me!”. These are obviously two opposite or different meanings of the term at interplay here. In the word sense we have the simultaneous implication of body and mind, mind and the world. Tact does not solve pedagogical paradoxes on its own, but is the freedom of improvisation.

The poet teacher

Wordsworth was the poet teacher who saw feeling as modified and directed by our thoughts. The task of the poet teacher is to connect his reader’s feelings with our objects of experience, for us grown-ups, “originally possessed of much sensibility”, to develop habits of observation and thinking that not only make us “in some degree enlightened”, but have our “affections strengthened and purified”. This brings me to a main point in this essay: that we can appreciate the pedagogical paradox only if we have open access to childhood described in collective memories, materialised in toys and dolls and games, and presented in books, pictures and films, including one’s own childhood recollections. The pedagogical paradox is not a free-floating puzzle pursued by logic, but determined by kairos, that is, by the time and place and the persons that interact in that context. Childhood is the land we leave behind when we grow into adulthood, and after history, the great arbiter, has lead childhood back into its fold. Yet it exists in our habits, thoughts and dreams, as expressed in the ongoing narrative that becomes one’s autobiography. We all have our autobiography in some fashion or other, even if not a single word about it leaves one’s lips or finds its way to the page. Now the prefix auto in autobiography

20
refers not to the private I, but to the personal and historical I that is given to recollection and reminiscing. One’s own biography seems to be the immediate linguistic link to the general auto, as observed in the fact that every time I say I in the first person singular, I invoke the we of the first person plural – the I as plural singular. Wordsworth the poet teacher declares that in his poetry he has “… wished to keep the Reader in the company of flesh and blood, persuaded that by so doing I shall interest him”.\textsuperscript{11} By that wish he brings the double nature of pedagogy to the fore: as persuasive action and as reflection and reserve, as holding back and letting go.

The pedagogical paradox reminds us of the double nature of pedagogy. It is a reminder that our care for the individual pupil and his or her independence as a person and a citizen cannot be reached only by entering the highway of teaching. The paradox also brings its possible solutions to light. In my reading Kant deals with the problem by consistently giving every advice a tag that says caution: discipline the child but don’t make his mind slavish; impose rules on him but remember to allow for his free judgment; praise him but don’t foster his vanity, constrain him but let him savour his freedom and dignity. He consistently leaves pedagogy to the teacher’s enlightened judgment and discretion according to a notion of the humanity in one’s person. Wordsworth likewise co-reflects with his reader what poetry is and should imply. He caters to his reader’s judgment by placing his own poetry in the landscape of other poetry. He introduces you to poetry but warns against “poetic diction”, that is, to poetic artifice as a “falsehood of description”\textsuperscript{12}. He wants to speak to ordinary men in their own language, which I take as a powerful invitation to dialogue open to the world of the student. Both he and his admittedly strange bedfellow, Kant, partake in what might be called experiential suspension or deferral. The pedagogical paradox signals an impasse, a cul-de-sac, a dead end for action. It is the formulation of an interaction that has gone awry and has to be configured anew.

Does the pedagogical paradox change anything, and if so where is the motive for change to be found? To the first question there is a yes and a no. In some cases the change seems – as in Hegel’s dialectical scheme – to be fuelled by the contradictory force of the paradox itself, that is, by the mental dissonance and the inability of the vulnerable party to endure a situation of submission, as when the employee leaves his job or the woman leaves her partner. In other cases, often in institutions that are organised around paternalisms the paradox is either suppressed or accepted because both parties, the teacher and the student and her parents, profit from it. In this trade-off the teacher keeps her authority, the student gets her grades and the parents keep
their hopes. But in other cases – I am tempted to say normal cases – the pedagogical paradox is not the name of a full-blown conflict in the classroom. It is not, then, a paradox to be finally solved, but simply the repeated description of an inherent educational predicament. What we learn from Kant is that the pedagogical paradox should keep constant watch over our pedagogical thinking, as the steady companion of the enlightened teacher, the sentinel always looking over her shoulder. It is at bottom the memento and, at the same time, the criterion for an enlightened pedagogy.

Notes

1. See also: Uljens (2004); Kristjánsson, (2007, esp Ch. 3).
2. For a more nuanced view, see Huggler (2004); Løvlie (1999).
6. The sentence appears as the motto in Wordsworth’s “Intimations of immortality from recollections of early childhood”, and runs like this:

The Child is father of the Man
And I could wish my days to be
Bound each to each by natural piety
(The College Survey of English Literature 1951, p 727).

7. In general, see Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1991): Emile or On Education. See also Løvlie (1997a,b).
10. Ibid p 702.
11. Ibid p 703.
12. Ibid p 703.
Does paradox count in education?

References


