The university as an encounter for deliberative communication

Creating cultural citizenship and professional responsibility

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How can higher and professional education contribute to the development of responsible citizenship and professional responsibility? In recent discussions on the role of the educational system, the idea of “deliberative communication” has been brought into focus and stands for communication in which different opinions and values can be set against each other in educational settings. It implies an endeavour by each individual to develop his or her view by listening, deliberating, seeking arguments and valuing, coupled to a collective and cooperative endeavour to find values and norms which everyone can accept, at the same time as pluralism is acknowledged. Within higher education deliberative communication might explicitly be used to develop professional responsibility and analysing consequences of different ways of solving problems. To what extent are and can universities become public spaces for encounters dealing with controversial questions of how to solve different problems and analyse different ways of professional acting? Can universities recreate their selective traditions, “institutionalize dissensus”, and “make the university a site of public debate” through deliberative communication?

Keywords: professional responsibility, citizenship rights, deliberative communication.

Towards responsible citizenship and professional responsibility

Progress towards deliberative democracy requires citizens with well-established deliberative attitudes, and a society that rests on the ideas of deliberative democracy is a long-term project – “democratic deliberation

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requires equal opportunity of access to political influence” (Knight & Johnson 1997, p. 280). This implies that certain institutions are given a central role, and the educational system is perhaps the institution with the greatest potential in such a long-term project, in that it can create the preconditions for developing deliberative capacities. One of the long-term ends-in-view to be achieved by giving deliberative communication a prominent place is that of developing the democratic role of different parts of the educational system: “In any effort to make democracy more deliberative, the single most important institution outside government is the educational system” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996, p. 359).

Is it possible and desirable, then, to see institutions of higher education (colleges and universities), too, as strategic sites for creating opportunities for democratic deliberation? In a historical perspective, the university has not had a role of educating for democracy. There are of course some exceptions, like the University of Chicago in the late 1890s and subsequently. The education of professionals in higher education institutions – “the professional complex” as it was called by one of its central architects, Parsons 1968 – can be seen as a focal point for the different interests and social forces behind the role of the universities in societal change. In many ways, of course, a professional society represented an evolutionary social advance in the direction of greater rationality in human affairs, but at the same time the technical-cognitive rationality of many professions came to be seen by many critical researchers as a threat to a deepening of democracy. In the long run the big universities have mainly developed as research universities for elites proving their excellence in different fields. University research has in many instances, and even more so lately, been geared more to the needs of big business than to the needs of people (even if there has been and is an ongoing struggle over that issue, and it also has to be said that a lot of research has created better living conditions for the masses). The mass universities/colleges have mainly developed to meet the vocational needs of general economic development, rather than to support the preconditions for a strengthening of democracy, even if citizenship education has figured prominently in the rhetoric.

In the Scandinavian countries and the United States, pressure to develop general democratic capabilities among the growing generations has for many years been put mainly on the compulsory school system if anywhere at all, although only in recent years has this been in terms of communicative abilities and democratic virtues. In the light of rapid and far-reaching societal changes, such as changing conditions for communication, a growing need for reflexivity etc., together with the evolution of higher education into a mass education system aimed at producing a suitable labour force and faced with the pressures of
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an “academic capitalism” (Slaughter & Leslie 1997), we may ask what kinds of tasks are given priority in the higher education system. We may also ask what kinds of identities and citizenships are being “produced” by the university system and especially by the professionals educated there, with their “diffuse social responsibility within a collective system” (Parsons 1968, p. 536).

One question that can be raised is whether the university should have a major role to play in developing “professional ethics and civic morals” (cf. Durkheim 1957/1992) or, to put it another way, should university studies be a kind of citizenship and moral education and if so, how? And what will the implications be when it comes to the higher education of professions that are situated in a field of force between the demands of profitability and the demands of developing “professional ethics and civic morals”? Will there be room for deliberation (Gutmann & Thompson 1996) even within these standard university and college courses leading to different professions? Will there be room for analysis of the often close relationship between facts and values, and for a view of knowledge as part of a commitment, for a “philosophy of knowledge”? Can the universities become public spaces for encounters between different cultures, different views of “how society works”, different views of “the good society” and different views of good professionalism? And lastly, how can we argue the case for such a development of higher education? I will start with the last question, approaching it from the tradition of seeing education as a citizenship right, and successively contextualize (higher) education in relation to the question of professional responsibility.

Higher education for cultural responsible citizenship

Basic education is seen by the social theorist Thomas H. Marshall (1949) as a social citizenship right (regarding social rights as the third step in the development of citizenship rights, the first two being civil and political rights), by which he meant that it is “the right of the adult citizen to have been educated”. But to what level do we need to be educated, and how should that level and the character of education be decided?

The search for cultural democracy and cultural citizenship through higher education may by many more be regarded as a fourth step, supplementing Marshall’s analysis of three forms of citizenship and citizenship rights. A cultural citizenship right could also be seen as an expression of the capacity to participate in the national and interna-
tional culture. Among leading social scientists who have developed these ideas one could mention Karl Mannheim in the 1920s (2000) and his “pedagogical optimism”, and Talcott Parsons in the 1960s (1966, 1971) and his analysis of the need for an “educational revolution”, in which he saw the universities as crucial in the evolution of modern societies, for example in their role of educating professionals. For Marshall and Parsons, however, the problem was primarily one of access to education and the function of the educational system in society as a whole, not so much a question of the “philosophy of knowledge” earlier raised by Mannheim and raised once again in the late 1960s and the 1970s during the culture wars of the universities and the questioning of the technical rationality of professionals. The culture wars clearly problematized the question of the content of university studies.

One way of developing Marshall’s theory of citizenship rights is put forward by Jürgen Habermas. In the discourse theory paradigm developed by Habermas (1996), rights to political participation are put centre stage. The perspective on citizenship rights which Habermas develops has many similarities to Marshall’s, but it differs mainly by stressing participation rights as the most fundamental. Like Marshall, Habermas makes a threefold division of rights and relates them to the liberal tradition in which individual autonomy is central. However, at the same time he focuses on the development of what he calls communicative rights, seeing those rights as bases for the rights to political participation: “Basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in processes of opinion- and will-formation in which citizens exercise their political autonomy and through which they generate legitimate law” (Habermas 1996, p. 123).

Habermas’s way of doing this is to see what Marshall calls civil rights – or negative freedom in Berlin’s (1950) vocabulary – as preconditions for political participation, the political citizenship rights which are the most important for Habermas. In his first category of rights, Habermas differentiates between classical rights of freedom or equal individual rights, rights that protect citizens’ membership of different associations and, thirdly, judicial guarantees for these rights to be protected and realized. All these three together create the communicative rights (the first category of rights) needed for political participation. The argument for stressing participation as the most important right is the inner connection seen by Habermas between the sovereignty of the people (democracy) and (citizenship) political rights (the second category). Compared to the liberal tradition, which views the state as protector of individual civil rights, the Habermasian discourse perspective sees the (democratic) state as the medium and expression
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of the people’s collective will-formation. This connection also implies that the political autonomy of citizens is realized not only through general laws, but through discursive communication processes. The third category of rights, welfare rights and among them education, are important supplementary rights in Habermas’s perspective, in relation to what has been said about creating conditions for individuals/citizens to participate equally in these discursive communication processes and, more specifically, in political processes.

The more precise role of the educational system in realizing these rights to participation remains somewhat unclear in Habermas’s work. An authoritative commentator such as Walter Reese-Schäfer (1995) stresses that the perspective put forward in *Between Facts and Norms* (Habermas 1996) “must, if one is analysing the potentials of change, lead to a development and nurturing of structures within the system of law and to an education of deliberative attitudes among the citizens who exercise this communicative power” (Reese-Schäfer 1995, p. 82, my translation).4 This position of Habermas can be further developed in relation to the liberal–communitarian spectrum.

The liberal-communitarian debate and the question of developing deliberative virtues

Seen in the political philosophical perspective of the liberal–communitarian debate, the problem of the virtue of deliberation and political participation can also be seen as a question of the (educational) relationship of each individual to society as a whole. In the early 1980s, communitarian philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and Michael Sandel (1982) characterized liberal talk of human or natural rights as sheer fictions because it falsely purported to employ a moral reason that transcended historically situated communities and the substantive common goods that gave focus to the development and exercise of virtue. For them, such liberal talk merely obscured the amoral character of the liberal individual, who learned to see social cooperation as adherence to a contractual system of rules in which self-interest alone could motivate parties to enter into the contract. Moral education was thus seen as impossible within the ethos of liberal modernity and could only be renewed through a revival of communities.

From another, but parallel, angle, Bellah et al. in *Habits of the Heart* (1985) and *The Good Society* (1991) and William Sullivan in *Reconstructing Public Philosophy* (1986) were seeking for a renewal of civic philosophy. Unlike the liberal idea of a contract, which emphasizes
mutual obligations within clearly defined limits, a civic covenant is a bond of fundamental trust founded upon a common commitment to a moral understanding. Civic moral education, for them, was natural in that it fulfilled humanity’s distinctive need to be at once self-reflective and yet interdependent members of a community.

Habermas’s discourse theory integrates fragments from both the liberal and the republican/communitarian traditions in the idea of an ideal procedure for deliberation. The implications of the theory for education are, as noted earlier, not explicit and Habermas can be interpreted in different ways. What can be said is that he places the realization of deliberative policy in the institutionalization of procedures, where an intersubjectivity on a higher level is expected to emerge; public discourses meet with a good response only under circumstances of broad participation. This, in turn, “requires a background political culture that is egalitarian, divested of all educational privileges, and thoroughly intellectual” (Habermas 1996, p. 490). Political autonomy cannot be realized by a person pursuing his or her own private interests, but only as a joint enterprise in an intersubjective, shared practice. In this respect, the deliberative project could be regarded as the continuation of the project of modernity.

What implications for higher education is it possible to see within this perspective? Of course they are not clear-cut, but I think that one obvious implication is a willingness to develop and also problematize the meaning of the “public good” of education in relation to the tradition of “private good” (cf. Englund 1994). In what perspective may we have to view the universities in order to fulfil the kind of aims that are related to the public good? Well, we need to look at higher education and universities as public spaces for advanced mutual reflection and deliberation, and not primarily as predestined curriculum routes preparing people for different vocations and private careers (nor as providing an isolated liberal education in the classics). We also have to look at higher education as a possible place for mutual engagement where common inquiry and argumentation are important principles. And to what extent are and can the universities become public spaces for encounters dealing with controversial questions, for example between different cultures, different views of how society works and different views of the good society? The point is whether universities can recreate their selective traditions and dare to “institutionalize dissensus” and “make the university a site of public debate” (Delanty 2001, p. 7). One clear example would be the possible development of professional education and how meanings of the “public good” and professional responsibility of this education can be problematized by, for instance, challenging the traditions of technical rationality.
Another prominent commentator on the liberal-communitarian debate and also an important proponent of democratic education, Amy Gutmann (1987), called for a democratic education in schools and universities, noting that “learning how to think carefully about political problems, to articulate one’s views and defend them before people with whom one disagrees is a form of moral education to which young adults are more receptive and for which universities are well suited” (Gutmann 1987, p. 173). Later she put the question, together with Dennis Thompson, whether there will be room for fruitful discussions of controversial issues, for deliberation – mutual and carefully balanced consideration of different alternatives – within standard university courses (Gutmann & Thompson 1996).

Later, Martha Nussbaum in her Cultivating Humanity (1997) asserts that the noble ideal of liberal education as a base for the cultural dimension has not been fully realized in colleges and universities, but rather subordinated to instrumentalism, to technical and vocational education. In her book, she sees the development of three capacities as essential: first, the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s traditions; second, the capacity to see oneself not simply as a citizen of some local region or group but also, and above all, as a human being bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern; and third, the capacity for narrative imagination, which “means the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story, and to understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have” (Nussbaum 1997, pp. 10–11).

Deliberative communication as a possible way?

In recent educational discussion on the democratic role of the educational system, the idea of “deliberative communication” has been brought into focus (Englund 2000b, 2006b). “Deliberative communication” stands for communication in which different opinions and values can be set against each other. It implies an endeavour by each individual to develop his or her view by listening, deliberating, seeking arguments and valuing, coupled to a collective and cooperative endeavour to find values and norms which everyone can accept, at the same time as pluralism is acknowledged. Current advocates of deliberative democracy stress the presence of different views or arguments, which are to be put against each other. Two or more different views on a subject are proposed by persons who confront each other, but with an openness in their argumentation. “While acknowledging that we
are destined to disagree, deliberative democracy also affirms that we are capable of deciding our common destiny on mutually acceptable terms” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996, p. 361). To the authors cited, deliberative democracy puts a particular emphasis on responsibility and consequences, implying that socialization to citizenship and the exercising of a citizenship must be in focus.

The meaning of deliberation as a term can be traced back to Aristotle and the Latin *deliberare* and *libra*, which mean “weigh” and “balance”. Historically, the word has been closely associated with the judicial process of carefully choosing between alternatives, and many different interpretations of it along these lines exist. There is also an obvious dimension of purposiveness in the concept, and it is in addition associated with accurate and responsible reflection. In the classroom setting, it is possible to evaluate which discussions are deliberative and which are not.

**Deliberative communication: Characterization and criteria for evaluation**

In the following, I will combine ideas from Habermas and other philosophers and social scientists mentioned, such as Gutmann and Nussbaum, without examining any problems of underlying contradictions arising from possible differences in the use of language and concepts. The characteristics of deliberative communication presented below can be further developed (and of course questioned) and used as a framework for a discussion of basic criteria for evaluation.⁵

- a. Different views are set against each other and arguments for these different views are given space and presented (cf. Habermas 1987a, 1996, Gutmann & Thompson 1996).

- b. There is tolerance and respect for the concrete other; participants learn to listen to the other person’s argument (Habermas 1987a, 1996, Benhabib 1992).

- c. Elements of collective will-formation are present, in other words an endeavour to reach consensus or at least to reach temporary agreements and/or to draw attention to differences (Habermas 1987a, 1996, Gutmann & Thompson 1996).

- d. Authorities/traditional views (represented, for example, by parents and tradition) can be questioned and there are op-
opportunities to challenge one’s own tradition (Gutmann 1987, Nussbaum 1996).

e. There is scope for students to communicate and deliberate without teacher control, in other words for argumentative discussions between students with the aim of solving problems or shedding light on them from different points of view.

Deliberative communication compared to some similar proposals for higher education

While the dominant tendencies in analysis of the role of today’s universities underline technical and scientific rationality, “the idea of excellence” and similar ideas that can be grouped under the umbrella of academic capitalism, there are also alternative metaphors, aiming for deliberative democracy as mentioned, critical professionalism (Barnett 1997), professional responsibility and civic professionalism (Sullivan 2005). University analysts like Readings (1996) and Delanty (2001) both point out the need for the university as a community of dissensus. Delanty briefly develops the dissensus idea, saying that “the point is to institutionalize dissensus and to make the university a site of public debate … that the central task of the university in the twenty-first century is to become a key actor in the public sphere and thereby enhance the democratization of knowledge” (Delanty 2001, pp. 7 and 9).

The suggestion put forward in this paper on deliberative communication may be seen as one possible way to develop the general idea advanced by Delanty (which I do not find more fully developed in his own work or that of Readings). It stresses the need not only to deliberately address conflicts of different kinds in higher education, but also to reach agreements, implying confrontations between different people even without the presence of a teacher. It also underlines the university as a public space where one’s private values and actions can be challenged, as well as accentuating the necessary pluralist character of education.

However, the idea of deliberative communication should be seen as a challenge (or to put it more cautiously, a supplement) not just to liberal education and traditional university courses, but also and perhaps more specifically to higher education programmes responsible for educating the future professionals of society. Will there be room for critical discussions about multiple discourses on civic and professional responsibility within professional education courses (Solbrekke & Karseth 2006)? Can the idea of deliberative communication assume its proper place within professional education courses? And why should it?
Professional responsibility through professional education at universities?

In many of his works, Durkheim elaborated on the need to develop professional ethics, civic morals and a moral individualism through education and other means. In his *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (Durkheim 1899/1957/1992), he argued that professional associations might help the wider society to develop new forms of civic morality and social solidarity through their propagation of values and their devotion to occupational craft and the development of a professional ethics.

In what way can we understand and apply his ideas to the present day? I will try to show how, even now, the analyses of Durkheim make sense of the relationship between higher education and the professions, and I will try to combine these analyses with Michael Walzer’s discussion in his *Spheres of Justice* (1983) of the roles of different (academic) professions in relation to different spheres. To begin with, it can be said, to quote Ronald Barnett, “that professionals are persons licensed to practise their trade” (Barnett 1997, p. 135), but this also means that “a professional is in authority, irrespective of any further authority she acquires as authority” (Peters 1967, cited from Barnett 1997, p. 135).

One of the starting points for Durkheim, and also for Walzer, is that the sphere of capitalist laws, profit etc. is not able to organize and solve a certain kind of problem in society, i.e. problems related to what can be called “the public good”, which the state has tried to solve by developing professions. Durkheim also believed that, in the economic sphere of social life, no professional ethic exists. However, the economic sphere and professions related to it will not be analysed in the following; the question that will be posed is concerned with the professions that are related to the public good, and especially with the role of higher education in relation to such professions. Referring to an analysis undertaken by the American sociologist Steven Brint in his *In an Age of Experts* (1994), I will concentrate in particular on the relationship between higher education and what he calls a “social trustee professionalism”.

Social trustee professionalism

Steven Brint (1994), interpreting the question of professionals in modern society, stresses that professionals in the Durkheimian sense, as a source of collective moral force in public life, are becoming less important. He also argues that the professional sphere as a whole is shifting in character, from a “social trustee professionalism” to more
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and more of an “expert professionalism” (but let us remember that he is primarily talking about the United States).

In general sociological terms and in relation to the research of recent decades on professionalism and professionalization (cf. note 2), it can also be said that in more and more occupations professionalization strategies have been developed to achieve autonomy and authority, higher wages, specific privileges etc. (and there is a huge literature on that kind of professionalization process). All of those things may have become more important than the relationship of the professions to their ethics and their civic morals. This relationship is not dead, but the tension between what can be called professionalization (towards expert professionalism) and (social trustee) professionalism can be seen in many professions, for example teaching (cf. Englund 1996a).

Brint (1994) distinguishes in his analysis five different spheres of professions. Three of these I will not be touching on in the following: firstly, the business service sphere and professionals close to the market, for example financial analysts and corporate lawyers; secondly, the applied sciences sphere, made up of engineers and geoscientists among others; and thirdly a sphere which in a way is closer to the traditions I will consider here, the culture and communication sphere, which includes academics, journalists and media professionals. Here I shall concentrate on the two spheres which are closest to the tradition of functioning as a source of collective moral force in public life, in other words social trustee professionalism, and my question is whether professions within these spheres still can and are to be seen in this way, and what the role of the higher education of these professional groups is and could be.

The two remaining spheres in Brint’s analysis, closer to the tradition of social trustee professionalism, are fourthly the civic regulation sphere, embodying judges, for instance; and fifthly, the human services sphere, made up of teachers, social workers, nurses and the like. Consequently, three of the professions identified by Brint, namely lawyers, teachers and nurses, and the higher education of those professions, can be seen as examples of a social trustee professionalism. The fourth profession I will mention is that of the psychologist.

Professional ethics and civic morals in today’s welfare state

How can we understand the professional ethics and civic morals of lawyers, psychologists, teachers and nurses today, and what is the role of higher education in relation to these professions? What different kinds of moral mission – related to the sphere of professional ethics and
civic morals – do the students in these different professional education programmes develop? More precisely, how do they view their (future) professional role in relation to the public or the common good and their role of “doing good for the other”? And in the same way, how does each professional education programme construct these roles? What would it be possible to do? Would deliberative communication be a possible model for developing a professional responsibility among these future professionals?

First, each profession has its specific history and its tensions. But some of the professions touched upon here, for example teachers and nurses, at least with regard to mass education and hospitals linked to citizenship as a social right (Marshall 1949), have historically been related to a kind of value rationality – to sentiments – which may gradually have changed into a scientific rationality in the context of a society ordered along functionalist lines (Parsons 1951, 1968), where science in different forms provided the basis for the profession. Later on, within what we can call a late or second modernity (Habermas 1996), one could perhaps also discuss a more argumentative dimension to these professions, with science still playing a leading role (cf. Englund 1986, 1989, 1996b). But what do these general changes imply for the principles of the public good and “doing good for the other” and for the professional education of the professions concerned?

Can a similar history be sketched out for professions such as lawyers? Well, that profession has had other historical links to power from ancient times on and in relation to more modern times. Like that of the psychologist, the legal profession is related more to a liberal society, with a one-to-one relationship of professional and client. The civil rights of (specific) citizens have formed a kind of base for this profession, and the education of lawyers, in turn, has been directly related to a set of laws and other judicial rules.

Teachers and nurses, as I have said, are in turn more related to the citizenry with reference to education and medical care as social rights. So what we can see is that different professions, as Margareta Bertilsson (1990) has pointed out, can be understood in relation to the dynamics and inner tensions of the development of citizenship rights. Thus, as Bertilsson argues and I would be inclined to agree, there seems to be “an intrinsic relationship between professional power and citizens’ rights as constitutive of one another”, because in today’s society the professions “have become both client- and citizen-constitutive” (Bertilsson 1990, p. 131). And, one could add, this is also a question with dynamic consequences, depending on how different citizenship rights are interpreted in (higher) education and in (educational) policy.
The crucial role of higher education

As Sullivan (2005) notes, there are three clusters of values in professional education: (1) the values of the academy, (2) the values of professional practice and (3) the ethical-social values of professional identity. This third set of values “emphasizes the professional’s integrity, sense of direction, and ability to assume responsibility for the quality of his or her own work and the standards associated with the field of practice. These values ground professional education in a broader conception of the purpose of the profession and the ideals to which it aspires, connecting training directly with the field’s social contract ... this blending of the normative and the technical is of the essence of good work” (Sullivan 2005, p. 29). But, as Sullivan notes, it is also this third dimension of professional education that generally receives the least attention in the formal curriculum. As I understand the problem, this third set of values has to be integrated with the other two, first by giving ethical-social values a (more) prominent place within the academy and secondly by promoting encounters between professionals in practice and students in professional programmes – in concrete terms, by creating arenas in academia where representatives of these two groups meet each other for deliberations. Giving ethical-social values a more prominent place within academia is of course a challenge to the often rational courses, but this also has to be supplemented by the encounters mentioned: where and when professional practitioners can come back in to the university and where and when they can confront the students and of course the university teachers.

By iterative deliberation over crucial issues, by mutual and carefully balanced consideration of different alternatives in professional education, students – from time to time together with professional practitioners – will be given opportunities to create, express and develop their meanings, challenge each other’s meanings and perhaps also change their meanings, persuaded by the best argument. Through deliberative communication, students (and practitioners) will also be given the chance to develop their judgement and thereby learn that there are always different possible performative language settings and hence different ways of categorizing, in many cases with different consequences, different evaluations and different interpretations, and that these situations have to be handled with professional responsibility.
Notes

1. Important steps in the early history of the views presented here are, first, ongoing work related to the Swedish journal *Utbildning & Demokrati* 9(1) (Education & Democracy) and especially its conference on “Higher education, democracy and citizenship”, arranged in December 2000 with Martha Nussbaum as the keynote speaker. The papers from the conference are published in English in *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 21 (4/5). Secondly, I would like to mention the symposium at the ASHE conference in November 2002, at which four of the participants in the present journal issue (Englund, Karseth, Solbrekke and Öst) presented papers and collaboration between Norwegian and Swedish researchers on these issues formally began. Thirdly, the NERA conference in Copenhagen in 2003 and the symposium on *The Normative Dimension of Higher Education*, when all five of us presenting articles in this journal issue also were presenting papers in this symposium together with four other presenters.

2. In using the term professionalism, I am focusing on what qualifications and acquired capacities, what competences, are required for the successful exercise of an occupation. The term professionalization is understood as a sociological project, relating to the authority and status of the profession, “a manifestation of the historical and social ambition of an occupational group to achieve status and a position in society” (Englund 1996a, p. 76).

3. The German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas has for decades influenced the social sciences and political debate on many questions. Through works such as *The Theory of Communicative Action I–II* (1984/1987a), *The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity* (1987b), *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (1990), *Justification and Application* (1993) and especially his *Between Facts and Norms* (1996), he has given us some basic starting points for an analysis of the relationship between society and education within a perspective of normative rationalization, i.e. the transformation of the source of the sacred to communication as collective will-formation. In this perspective, what ultimately explains social integration is communicative and argumentative consensual processes. It is the good argument that creates validity, a validity that also has an integrative force. Habermas’s (1984/1987a) theory of communicative action, further developed into a model for deliberative democracy and a discourse theory of law and democracy (1996), is perhaps also the most developed and well-known theory of deliberative democracy (cf. Bohman & Rehg eds. 1997). His model is developed in relation to the liberal and the republican/communitarian traditions, and in his analysis he has emphasized the different citizenship concepts of these traditions. Habermas (1996) has also underscored how the usual dichotomized conceptualization around citizenship rights within these traditions “fail[s] to grasp the intersubjective meanings of a system of rights that citizens mutually accord one another” (p. 271).

4. For an interpretation of the role of education from that perspective, see Carleheden 2006 and Englund 2006a,b and further on in this article.

5. These five characteristics of deliberative communication were developed earlier in relation to an ongoing debate on the democratic role of the comprehensive schools in Sweden (Englund 2000a). The idea of deliberative communication, its sources of inspiration and its characteristics are further elaborated in
Englund 2006b. There is one source of inspiration not mentioned earlier here, namely classical pragmatism, especially Dewey and Mead (cf. Englund 2000b), concerning which it can be said that pragmatism is an old name for some new ways of thinking (cf. Kloppenberg 1998).

6. In these works (Englund 1986, 1989) I am distinguishing three rationalities of education, a value rationality (patriarchal), a scientific rationality and a democratic rationality.

7. One example would be the ongoing discussion about how to understand basic education as a social right for each citizen in the making or as a civil, parental right (cf. Englund 1994). Another example would be the analysis of civil citizenship versus social citizenship, undertaken by Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon (1994).

References


